This research studies the specic determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in resource-rich countries. We run multinomial logit regressions for an unbalanced panel data set of 145 countries over the 1975-2004 period. We nd that resource-rich countries are more likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime compared to resource-poor countries. Furthermore, we provide evidence that output volatility contributes to the likelihood of choosing a xed exchange rate regime positively in resource-rich countries and negatively in resource-poor countries. We believe that in resource-rich countries a xed exchange rate regime is mainly preferred due to its stabilization function in the face of turbulent foreign exchange inows. Moreover, our results reveal that the role of democracy and independent central banks in choosing more exible exchange rate regimes is stronger in resource-rich countries. In resource-rich countries that possess non-democratic institutions and non-independent central banks, the government is less accountable in spending natural resource revenues and scal dominance prevails. In this situation, uctuations in natural resource revenues are more easily transmitted into the domestic economy and therefore a xed exchange rate becomes a more favorable option.
Introduction
In the economic literature much attention has been devoted to the choice of exchange rate regime. Often policymakers are challenged to choose between a xed exchange rate regime, which may provide trade gains and policy crutch, and a oating exchange rate regime, which does not undermine the independence of monetary policy and accommodates the terms of trade shocks. The problem of choosing an appropriate exchange rate strategy is even sharper in resource-rich countries (RRCs) that are exposed to large and volatile foreign exchange inows. There is empirical evidence that fuel exporters are more likely to have a pegged exchange rate regime (Klein and Shambaugh, 2009) . Such behavior may have a rationale, as a natural resource exporting economy facing volatile and huge foreign exchange inows may benet from pegging its currency to the dollar (Aliyev, 2012 1 ) or to the oil price (Frankel, 2003) . Questions then arise as to whether RRCs benet from extra stabilization advantages of pegging and what determines the choice of exchange rate regime in these countries. To our knowledge there is no empirical study that focuses on these questions.
The main objective of this research is to address these questions by focusing on the specic determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in RRCs. Given the nature of the dependent variable, which is a categorical variable that denes dierent exchange rate regimes, we run multinomial logit regressions for an unbalanced panel data set of 145 countries over the 1975-2004 period. We incorporate dierent theories that are trying to explain the determinants of exchange rate regime.
Besides various variables from the literature, our study also includes additional variables that could be interesting from the point of view of RRCs. We expect that a specic set of variables, such as democracy, output volatility, central bank independence, and scal discipline may aect the choice of exchange rate regime dierently in RRCs.
To check this expectation we analyze the multiplicative eect of these 1 Aliyev (2012) in a theoretical framework predicts that, under certain conditions pegging the exchange rate allows the softening of the negative eects of Dutch Disease and partially stabilizes the economy in the face of volatile natural resource revenues.
3 variables with a resource-richness variable on the choice of exchange rate regime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the theories of the determinants and classication of exchange rate regimes and discusses some important issues related to exchange rate regimes in RRCs. Section 3 describes our methodology and data. The results and ndings are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Theoretical Determinants of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
Until recently the economic literature was extensively studying the growth eects of exchange rate regimes (Gosh et al., 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger, 2003; Husain et al., 2004 ). More recent literature draws possible endogeneity of the choice of exchange rate regime to the front line and rather focuses on the determinants of this choice than its eects on macroeconomic variables (Berdiev et al., 2012; LevyYeyati et al., 2010; Markiewicz, 2006; Von Hagen and Zhou, 2007) . In the economic literature three major approaches that explain the choice of exchange rate regimes are (i) Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory, (ii) nancial view, and (iii) political view. Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger (2010) provide an extensive review on how these three theories were emerged. All these theories have been empirically tested by many scholars who analyze the determination process of exchange rate regimes.
According to the OCA theory (originally formulated by Mundell, 1961) geographical location, trade links, size, openness, and intrinsic shocks are the main determinants of the exchange rate regime. From this perspective the trade and welfare gains from a stable exchange rate are compared with the benets of exchange rate exibility as a shock absorber. For instance, more open countries are more likely to have a pegged regime. Or, given the fact that smaller countries trade more, one can expect that these countries also tend to have less exible regimes.
The Financial view is based on the impossible trinity hypothesis, according 4 to which only two out of three goals can be attained: exchange rate stabilization, free capital mobility, and independent monetary policy. Recent global nancial deepening and innovation diminished the eectiveness of capital controls. In the presence of free capital mobility the impossible trinity dilemma is reduced to the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes, which denes a xed exchange rate regime and independent monetary policy tradeo. According to this view, low nancial development should increase the probability of adopting pegs.
The Political view highlights political factors as a determinant of exchange rate regime. Less developed countries experiencing low institutional credibility may adopt a peg as a policy crutch. These countries are more corrupted and have a higher level of bureaucracy, therefore, they need to have a stable currency to attract international investors and possibly to provide illegal opportunities for inuential members of society. In contrast, in more democratic countries governments are more interested in inuencing the economy and hence are more likely to use exible regimes.
Classication of Exchange Rate Regimes
The classication of exchange rate regimes deserves some explanation. Until recently most of the research relied on de jure exchange rate regime classication which is based on countries' ocial announcements to the IMF (IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions). However, in practice, countries usually demonstrate fear of oating and do not allow their exchange rate to oat against their ocial reports (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; LevyYeyati and Struzenegger, 2005) . Therefore, there is a growing popularity of using de facto regime classications which describe the exchange rate strategies better than de jure regime classications. Struzeneggers' (2003, 2005) de facto exchange rate regime classication is based on the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate, the volatility of exchange rate changes and the volatility of foreign reserves. Reinhart and Rogos' (2004) approach is more sophisticated and accounts for country chronologies, which includes information on the ocial exchange rate regime, the anchor currency and other important economic events and dierences between the ocial and parallel exchange rates.
The codings of all three directions (de jure classication by IMF, de facto classications by Struzenegger, 2003-2005 , and by Reinhart and Rogo, 2004 ) have been widely used by many scholars and the studies based on de facto classications signicantly dier from the ones that are based on de jure classication. Reinhart and Rogo (2004) indicate that only rich and nancially developed countries can benet from the exibility of exchange rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogo, 2004; Husain et al., 2005; Aghion et al., 2009) . The general conclusion is that countries usually deviate from their ocial announcements and hence research that is based on de facto classications delivers more reasonable results. Therefore, in our study we use three-way and ve-way classications proposed by Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger (2003) .
Exchange Rate Regimes in RRCs
The literature agrees that there is no single exchange rate regime right for all countries (Frankel, 1999) and often focuses on a special set of determinants and group of countries with similar characteristics. RRCs dier from other countries by experi-2 See Harms and Kretschmann (2009) for an extensive survey. 6 encing a huge and volatile inow of foreign exchange. In the face of these windfalls RRCs are challenged in achieving stabilization in the short, and economic growth in the long run. Klein and Shambaugh (2009) nd that fuel exporters are more likely to peg compared to non-fuel countries. Moreover, it has been documented that the price of oil has a signicant eect on real exchange rates in oil rich countries, more precisely, a higher oil price leads to appreciation of the real exchange rate in these countries (Korhonen and Juurikkala, 2009 ). The eects of oil price change on the domestic economy are mainly transmitted through scal policy (Husain et al., 2008) .
The intuition behind these phenomena is straightforward: soaring oil prices or the discovery of natural resource reserves increase a government's income denominated in foreign exchange and scal expansion nanced through these resources creates appreciation pressure on the domestic currency. In this situation, a monetary authority can choose only one out of the two sides of the stick: it can either stabilize the nominal exchange rate at the cost of high ination or it can control ination by allowing the nominal exchange rate to adjust.
The evidence supports the contention that monetary authorities in RRCs mainly choose the rst option. Aliyev (2012) shows that besides arguments of existing theories of exchange rate determination there may be an additional rationale to peg the exchange rate in resource-rich developing countries. More precisely, under undisciplined scal policy 3 by xing the exchange rate monetary authorities in RRCs may contribute to achieving consumption smoothing across generations and softening the negative eects of Dutch Disease during a boom. Therefore, it could be interesting to study the role of certain factors in the determination of exchange rate regimes in RRCs. To our best knowledge there is no empirical study that concentrates on this issue, and we are trying to ll this gap by focusing on a specic set of determinants such as macroeconomic volatility, democracy, central bank independence, and scal 3 In this context undisciplined scal policy denes a situation when windfall revenues are spent in the short run, while under disciplined scal policy scal spending is maintained relatively constant in the long run. 
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The discrete variable y it denotes the choice of exchange rate regime by country i at period t and is dened as: (1)
The probability of choosing regime j is denoted by p j , such that
The choice of exchange rate regime is described by a latent variable y * i,t which denotes the unobserved utility that government i derives in year t from a xed regime. y * i,t is determined as a linear function of dierent explanatory variables X i,t , natural resource-richness dummy D nr i,t and its interaction term with specic set of
4 To check the robustness of our results we also use the 5-way classication in our estimations. 5 The information criteria of Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn do not clearly favor any model so we employ logit model in our estimations. The econometric literature suggests using a country xed-eects model on panel data. However, a country-specic xed-eects model may produce inconsistent results if maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is used (see Chamberlain, 1980) . Therefore, we do not employ a country xed-eects model in our estimations.
Where N denotes the number of countries and T i is the number of observations for country i. We assume that the error term u i,t is i.i.d. with standard logistic distribution. The probabilities of country i choosing regime j at period t are dened in the following way: y i,t = 1 if y * i,t < c 1 and P r(y i,t = 1) = P r(y * i,t < c 1 ), y i,t = 2 if c 1 < y * i,t < c 2 and P r(y i,t = 2) = P r(c 1 < y * i,t < c 2 ),
where c 1 and c 2 (c 1 < c 2 ) are thresholds dening the edges between dierent regimes.
The estimates of all the coecients and thresholds c 1 and c 2 are obtained by using the maximum likelihood technique.
In order to reduce the potential endogeneity we use lagged values for some explanatory variables. This correction for endogeneity bias may not be a sucient solution. Some authors try to resolve the endogeneity problem by replacing the variables with their initial values or by using the instrumental variables. However, due to certain limitations these techniques are ineective in dealing with the endogeneity problem.
The list of control variables X i,t and their classication according to dierent approaches are given in Table 1 . Most of these explanatory variables are taken from the standard literature and the reasoning behind them is described in the literature review section. The predictions of the OCA theory are tested by including the country's openness and its size. A-priori, we expect that larger and more open countries are more likely to adopt more exible exchange rate regimes. To test the Financial view we include the ratio of private credit to GDP as a measure of the nancial development and the Chinn-Ito index which measures a country's degree of capital account openness.
6 To capture the eects of political factors on the choice of exchange rate regime we use central bank independence index, democracy 6 Because of a huge number of missing data in our estimations we do not include liability dollarization, a variable commonly used in the literature for testing the Financial view. Surprisingly, in the robustness test the dollarization variable appears to be insignicant. Besides these variables, we also control for three additional variables and their interaction terms with a resource-richness dummy: volatility of GDP, the cyclicality of scal policy, and scal elasticity (the elasticity of government consumption expenditure to income). Independent eects of these additional variables need to be explained. The eect of GDP volatility on the choice of exchange rate regime is pretty straightforward since the later one has a direct impact on the economic activity in the short run. Exchange rate is extensively used among other policy tools in dealing with macroeconomic stabilization. The cyclicality and the elasticity of scal expenditure have similar eects on the choice of exchange rate regime. Both variables can be an important determinant of the choice of exchange rate regime, especially in natural-resource exporting countries. For instance, in an undisciplined scal environment where scal policy is procyclical or scal elasticity is high, an oil exporting economy is challenged by volatility in the money market. In this situation a pegged regime may serve as a shock absorber.
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In line with these three variables we also focus on the interaction of democ-7 A mechanism of how exchange rate regime aects macroeconomic stabilization and how scal discipline shapes the overall macroeconomic situation is extensively explained in Aliyev (2012). A detailed summary statistics about dierent variables is provided in Table 6 in Appendix A.1.
We borrow the de facto exchange rate regime classication from Struzenegger (2003, 2005) . Specically we use two ways of classication named lys_3 for three-way classication and lys_5 for ve-way classication.
As a measure of size we use natural logarithm of real GDP. To control openness we employ two measures: de facto capital account openness (open) estimated as the GDP share of the average of exports plus imports and de jure capital account openness (ka_open) measured by Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2008) . We also control for CPI as a measure of ination. Financial development is captured by the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. Democracy variable (dem) comes from Cheibub (2010) . The distribution of number of observations according to democracy and resource-richness is given in Table 7 in Appendix A.1. Based on visual inspection we can see that the majority of RRCs are non-democratic.
We use the central bank independence index from Arnone et al. (2007) and Klomp and De Haan (2009). 8 Central bank independence is built based on two indicators of central bank autonomy: (i) political autonomy, the ability of the central bank to choose the objectives of monetary policy, and (ii) economic autonomy, the ability of the central bank to choose its instruments (the methodology is proposed by Grilli et al., 1991) .
In our specication a country is considered natural resource exporting if its natural resource (ores, metals, and fuel) exports' share is larger than one half of total merchandize exports. Although the threshold may seem large, countries exposed to a windfall of huge natural resource revenues lie in our interest area. GDP volatility is measured as a standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP over a rolling centered ve-year period.
We use two alternative measures of scal discipline: (i) the scal cyclicality (f is_cyc) and (ii) the elasticity of government consumption (f is_el). To estimate the cyclicality measure we run the following regression of the growth of real government expenditures on real GDP growth (similar to Woo, 2009) . From the rst-pass over the data it is interesting to explore the distribution of exchange rate regimes across countries ( Figure 1 ). As can easily be seen from the gure, RRCs adopt a xed exchange rate regime more frequently as compared to resource-poor countries. In 1980 86% of RRCs adopted a xed exchange rate regime, hence this number was 70% among resource-poor countries. In 2004 the relative disparity between resource-rich and resource-poor countries remained (a xed exchange rate regime is adopted by 70% of resource-rich and by 56% of resource-poor countries), though overall popularity of a xed exchange rate regime dropped in both groups.
Results
All our main results are summarized in Tables 2 -4: Table 2 
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9 The reason of us splitting the sample into developing and developed countries is that there are only few developed countries that export natural resources in large quantities and it would be more proper to focus on developing countries that share many similarities. 10 Berdiev et al. (2012) , Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) , Von Hagen and Zhou (2007) among many others nd similar results. We also conrm that higher central bank independence is associated with more exible exchange rate regimes. A xed exchange rate regime constraint the central bank to conducting independent monetary policy and a exible exchange rate regime enables the central bank to have full control over the monetary policy decisions (Siklos, 2008) . Therefore, a more exible exchange rate regime is more likely to be used by an independent central bank. Our results indicate that democratic countries are more likely to adopt exible exchange rate regimes. A exible exchange rate regime allows the government to conduct monetary policy toward domestic stabilization purposes. Democratic countries are more transparent and possess politically accountable institutions. These ndings about central bank independence and democracy are intuitive and in line with the political view.
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The negative sign on the coecient of ination indicates that higher rates of ination lower the likelihood of a xed regime. This result is similar to the ndings of Berdiev et al. (2012) and Markiewicz (2006) . One explanation for this nding could be that it is dicult to maintain stable exchange rate in countries with high levels of consumer prices. Hence high ination rates may undermine the credibility of a xed regime, and force a country to move towards a exible regime. Another explanation for this relationship could be that a xed exchange rate regime may cause low rates of ination.
Positive coecients on the nancial development measure in developing countries imply that greater nancial development increases the probability of a xed exchange rate regime in these countries. This nding can be explained through a high correlation of nancial deepness with denominated debt and greater currency mismatches in developing countries (Berdiev, 2012; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2005; Levy-Yeyati et al., 2010) . However, in developed countries the nancial view holds, since higher nancial development is associated with more exible exchange rate regimes. Capital account openness has a signicant and positive coecient for the full sample, but it is insignicant if developed and developing countries are analyzed separately.
Our notable nding is that the probability of implementing a pegged exchange rate regime is higher in RRCs compared to resource-poor countries. This result is depicted in Figure 2 , where we obtain dierent probabilities by holding all other explanatory variables at their mean. A similar conclusion has been documented by Klein and Shambaugh (2009) for fuel exporting countries. Our study extends We get signicant eects of scal cyclicality and its interaction with the resource-richness dummy on the choice of exchange rate regime. According to our results, countries with procyclical scal policies are less likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime, meaning that if we move from countries with countercyclical policies towards countries with procyclical scal policies, the probability of adopting a xed exchange rate regime diminishes. This can be due to diculties in maintaining exchange rate stability in countries where governments pursue a procyclical scal policy. We observe that if scal policy is countercyclical, then RRCs are more likely to peg their exchange rate. However, when scal policy becomes procyclical, the probability of pegging in RRCs drops below the probability of pegging in resource-poor countries.
A procyclical scal policy in RRCs a situation when the government changes scal expenditure in response to changes in income from natural resource exports might make it even more dicult to achieve a pegged exchange rate regime.
Fiscal elasticity increases the overall probability of a xed exchange rate regime, meaning that adoption of a xed exchange rate regime is more likely in countries where the response of scal expenditure to changes in income is high. Its multiplication eect with resource-richness is insignicant.
Robustness Checks
All our robustness checks are given in Appendix A.2. To test the robustness of our results, rst, we estimate the model with 5-way exchange rate regime classication, instead of 3-way classication used in our benchmark specication 12 . The results for developing countries with 5-way classication are described in Table 9 13 . One can easily check that the signs and signicance of the coecients are similar in both classications. The main dierences are in the relative values of the coecients.
We also focus solely on fuel exporting countries instead of all natural resource exporting countries. The results with fuel exporting developing countries are sum-12 Basically it is rather a 4-way classication, since there are only 9 observations (0.33% of total) that belong to the inconclusive category. Observations with these categories are dropped in order to keep the consistency of ordered logit estimations. 13 The results for the full set of countries and for developing countries are also similar to the benchmark results, so we do not report them. marized in Table 10 . As we can see, new coecients do not signicantly dier from the ones in the benchmark specication.
As the nal test, we estimate our model with additional control variables: interest rate, years oce, and dollarization. To measure interest rate we use the lending interest rate from WDI. Years oce is obtained from the Database of Political institutions 2012, and indicates how many years the chief executive has been in oce. And for dollarization, we use the deposit dollarization ratio (foreign currency deposits over total deposits) assembled by Levy and Yeyati (2006) .
The estimation results with these additional variables are summarized in Table   11 . We can see that with additional variables the number of observations is reduced more than threefold. Therefore, direct comparison of the new results with the benchmark specication is inappropriate. With additional variables the eect of capital account openness becomes insignicant and nancial development obtains signicant coecients. Interest rate and years the chief executive has been in oce both are insignicant.
A-priori we could expect that to deal with high dollarization a xed exchange rate regime may be preferred, since stability of the exchange rate may increase the condence of residents in the domestic currency. However, our estimation results indicate that higher levels of dollarization are associated with lower probability of a xed regime in all specications. We believe that in this relationship the eect works in a reverse direction. A pegged exchange rate regime increases the faith of residents in the domestic currency as they switch from foreign currency to domestic and dollarization falls. Therefore, we observe negative coecients on the dollarization variable.
Conclusion
In this research we analyze the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in 145 countries over 1975-2004 period by primarily focusing on RRCs. As found by other studies in the literature, we conrm that size, openness, nancial development, central bank independence, and democracy are important determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime.
Moreover, our results reveal that RRCs are more likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime compared to resource-poor countries. We think that on the background of large and volatile foreign exchange inows, pegging exchange rate might have a rationale. In a natural resource exporting economy a xed exchange rate regime may seem the best option to achieve short-term stabilization. The data provides support for this position: the probability of adoption of a xed exchange rate regime decreases in resource-poor countries and increases in resource-rich countries with higher values of output volatility. In RRCs the output mainly consists of natural resources and therefore, the uctuations in natural resource extraction and exports are the main sources of output volatility. Therefore, we can conclude that, in RRCs a xed exchange rate regime is mainly preferred due to its stabilization function in the face of turbulent foreign exchange inows.
Our study unveils that democracy and central bank independence aect the choice of exchange rate regime dierently in RRCs. Estimations show that democratic countries are less likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime both in resourcerich and resource-poor countries. However, we nd that the eect of democracy is stronger in resource-rich countries. In other words, in RRCs democratic institutions play a stronger role in supporting more exible exchange rate regimes. Previous studies have shown that central bank independence decreases the probability of a xed exchange rate regime. In line with this phenomenon, our results indicate that the eect of central bank autonomy is more pronounced in resource-rich countries as compared to resource-poor ones. This implies that in RRCs more independent central banks are more inclined towards choosing a exible exchange rate regime.
In resource-rich countries with non-democratic institutions and non-independent central banks, the government is less accountable in spending natural resource revenues and scal dominance is more likely. In this situation, uctuations in natural resource revenues are more easily transmitted into the domestic economy and therefore a xed exchange rate becomes a more favorable option.
According to our results countries with procyclical scal policies are less likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime, meaning that if we move from countries with countercyclical policies towards countries with procyclical scal policies, the probability of adopting a xed exchange rate regime diminishes. This can be due to diculties in maintaining exchange rate stability in countries where governments pursue a procyclical scal policy. We observe that if scal policy is countercyclical, then RRCs are more likely to peg their exchange rate. However, when scal policy becomes procyclical, the probability of pegging in RRCs drops below the probability of pegging in resource-poor countries. A procyclical scal policy in RRCs a situation when the government changes scal expenditure in response to changes in income from natural resource exports might make it even more dicult to achieve a pegged exchange rate regime.
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